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Abstract
We consider a sender-receiver game with an outside option for the sender.
After the cheap talk phase, the receiver makes a proposal to the sender, which
the latter can reject. We study situations in which the sender’s approval is
crucial to the receiver.
We show that a partitional, (perfect Bayesian Nash) equilibrium exists if
the sender has only two types or if the receiver’s preferences over decisions do
not depend on the type of the sender as long as the latter participates. The
result does not extend: we construct a counter-example (with three types for
the sender and type-dependent affine utility functions) in which there is no
mixed equilibrium. In the three type case, we provide a full characterization
of (possibly mediated) equilibria.
2
1 Introduction
We consider a general model of sender-receiver games. The specific feature
of our games is that the sender has an outside option. After the cheap talk
phase, the receiver proposes a decision to the sender; if the sender approves it,
the decision is made; otherwise, the sender chooses his outside option, which
can be interpreted as “exit”. Under complete information, the game reduces
to an ultimatum game, in which one player makes a “take it or leave it” offer
to the other. In our framework, this other player has private information and
can send a costless message to the receiver before getting an offer.
We are interested in situations in which the sender’s approval is crucial to
the receiver. We thus assume that the receiver’s utility in case of exit is very
low, as compared to what he can expect if the sender accepts his proposal.
It is not difficult to find examples in which a decision-maker consults with an
informed party before making a proposal that can be ultimately rejected and
in which rejection has unvaluable, damaging consequences for the decision-
maker. For instance, firms try to figure out workers’ requirements in order
to avoid strikes and boycotts. Governments discuss with kidnappers, hoping
that hostages will not be killed. As a third example, analyzed in Matthews
(1989), the U.S. Congress may worry about the President’s veto.
We focus on equilibria in which the sender does not make uncredible
threats at the approval stage, namely, accepts a proposal if and only if it
gives him at least the utility of his outside option.1 We ask whether our
sender-receiver game has an equilibrium in which exit does not occur.
To answer this question, we introduce an auxiliary “limit game” Γ, in
which equilibria are necessarily without exit. The equilibria of Γ are easily
characterized by two sets of conditions: incentive compatibility and con-
strained optimization. Both sets of conditions are tractable but satisfying
them jointly is demanding. Existence of an equilibrium in the game Γ is not
obvious. For instance, as opposed to standard sender-receiver games, Γ may
not have any nonrevealing equilibrium. This means that, in absence of infor-
mation transmission, the receiver cannot make any decision that would give
at least his reservation utility to the sender, whatever his type. We identify
various assumptions which guarantee that, in a situation like this, the sender
can credibly reveal some information to the receiver, in such a way that exit
1Our solution concept is basically subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Except for the ap-
proval stage, our model behaves as a standard cheap talk game, in which Perfect Bayesian
equilibrium is not restrictive.
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will never happen.
We maintain the following assumptions on the game Γ: the sender has
finitely many types (which can be multidimensional, e.g., belong to Rn1, for
some n1), the receiver has a compact set of decisions (typically, a closed,
bounded set in Rn2 , for some n2) and both players’ utility functions are
continuous.2 We also make the sine qua non assumption that under complete
information, i.e., when the receiver knows the sender’s type, there exists
a decision that gives the sender at least his reservation utility. We then
consider the subsets of all types such that there is a decision inducing them to
participate and we call “participation structure” the maximal subsets (with
respect to set inclusion). For instance, if the sender has only two possible
types, 1 and 2, the participation structure is either {{1} , {2}} or {1, 2}.
We establish that the game Γ has a partitional equilibrium, namely, an
equilibrium in which the sender’s strategy is pure, in the following cases:
(i) the sender has two types;
(ii) the participation structure is a partition of the type set;
(iii) the decision set is a real interval and for every type, the sender’s utility
function is monotonic in the receiver’s decision;
(iv) the receiver’s utility function – when the sender participates – does not
depend on the sender’s type.
Cases (i) and (ii) are rather straightforward, with (ii) generalizing (i).
Case (iii) applies in particular when the receiver has only two actions, over
which he can randomize. Case (iv) has the most important scope. It applies
as soon as the receiver knows his own preferences over decisions, but is eager
to make a choice that will ensure the – type-dependent – informed player’s
participation. Existence of a partitional equilibrium under (iv) is the main
result of the paper (Theorem 8).
The previous assumptions may look restrictive, but, without them, ex-
istence of an equilibrium in Γ cannot be guaranteed, even if the sender is
allowed to use a mixed strategy. We indeed propose an example, in which
the sender has three types, the receiver has three actions, the participation
structure is not a partition and the utility functions are type-dependent. In
2This covers the particular case where the receiver has finitely many actions, over which
he can randomize.
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this example, there is no mixed equilibrium. However, an equilibrium does
exist if the information transmission stage is handled by a mediator.
Finally, we propose a complete analysis when the sender has three pos-
sible types. We identify two kinds of “participation structures” beyond the
straightforward case (ii) above. The first one arises in the example mentioned
in the previous paragraph. Existence of a mediated equilibrium can then be
established. In the other case, another example shows that there may not
be any partitional equilibrium. However we prove that there always exists a
mixed equilibrium if the decision set is convex and the utility functions are
affine (Proposition 9).
Here is a description of the paper. We discuss the related literature below.
In Section 2, we make the sender-receiver game Γ and the solution concept
fully precise. Propositions 3 and 4 (which are established in Section 6.1)
allow us to argue that the game Γ is relevant to our study. In Section 3, we
establish existence of a partitional equilibrium in Γ under assumptions (i),
(ii), (iii) or (iv) above. Our main result, Theorem 8, is associated with case
(iv). Section 4 is devoted to examples. Sections 4.1 and 4.2 propose a family
of kidnapping games. Section 4.1 illustrates partitional equilibrium. Section
4.2 proposes a game that does not have any partitional equilibrium but has
a mixed equilibrium. Section 4.3 goes on with a game that does not have
any mixed equilibrium but has a mediated equilibrium. The three type case,
including Proposition 9, is the topic of Section 5. Section 6 is an appendix
containing the proofs of Propositions 3, 4 (Section 6.1) and 9 (Section 6.2).
Related papers
Shimizu (2013, 2017) adds an approval stage to Crawford and Sobel
(1982)’s sender-receiver game, in the popular case where the prior is uniform
over the unit interval and the utility functions are quadratic. He assumes, as
we do, that exit is damaging for the receiver but the setup is otherwise quite
different from ours. He shows that, in his particular model, credible exit
possibilities can make cheap talk informative even when the players’ conflict
of interest is relatively large.
Matthews (1989) studies a sender-receiver game motivated by a specific
application, in which the sender is the U.S. President, the receiver is the
Congress and the decision is about a practical matter, like the level of military
expenditures. The President can veto the Congress’ proposal. Preferences
are unimodal, as in Shimizu (2013, 2017), but the receiver’s utility does not
depend on the sender’s type (as in the current paper, Theorem 8, Section
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3.4). More importantly, in Matthews (1989)’s model, the sender’s rejection
leads to status quo, rather than to exit, and does not necessarily yield a
very low utility to the receiver. Matthews (1989)’s point is to show that
thanks to incomplete information on the President’s type, veto can happen
at equilibrium, i.e., without relying on uncredible threats.
Our model can be viewed as a principal-agent problem in which the prin-
cipal – alias the receiver – cannot commit to a mechanism at the ex ante
stage. This is an extreme case of Bester and Strausz (2001)’s principal-agent
problem with limited commitment. In this context, it makes sense to allow
the agent – alias the sender – to veto the principal’s decision. Under a mecha-
nism design perspective, the principal looks for an equilibrium that gives him
the best ex ante expected utility, which amounts to an equilibrium in which
all types accept the principal’s proposal if the principal’s utility, when the
agent chooses his outside option, is sufficiently low. This leads us to impose
individual rationality conditions for the agent at the “posterior” stage, i.e.,
after the principal has made a proposal. The relevance of posterior individ-
ual rationality and its impact on incentive compatibility have been stressed
in a number of papers, e.g., Gresik (1991), Compte and Jehiel (2007, 2009)
Forges (1990, 1999) and Matthews and Postlewaite (1989).
Finally, Forges and Horst (2018)’s concept “talk and cooperate (perfect
Bayesian) equilibrium” (TCE, Section 5.3) is motivated by the same ques-
tions as the present paper, but is defined in a different model: the sender also
has to make a decision, which is relevant to his own payoff only. At a TCE,
the receiver (who can be interpreted as a principal) proposes a joint decision,
which the sender accepts whatever his type. Should player 1 reject player 2’s
proposal, both players would choose an action, independently of each other.
By contrast, in the present paper, the sender just chooses an outside option.
Forges and Horst (2018) establish an existence result for another solution
concept – “cooperate and talk (perfect Bayesian) equilibrium” (CTE) – but
just indicate that their methodology does not apply to TCE.
2 Model
2.1 Sender-receiver games
We start with a family of games Γ(v0), v0 ∈ R, between a sender (player 1)
and a receiver (player 2). Γ(v0) is described as follows:
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• A type k ∈ K is chosen according to a prior probability p ∈ ∆(K).
• Player 1 is informed of k.
• Player 1 sends a message m ∈M to player 2.
• Player 2 proposes a decision x ∈ X to player 1.
• If player 1 accepts player 2’s proposal, the decision x is enforced, player
1 gets Uk(x) and player 2 gets V k(x).
• If player 1 rejects player 2’s proposal, player 1 chooses an outside option
and gets uk0. Player 2 gets v0.
We assume that:
• The set of types K is finite3 and pk > 0 ∀k ∈ K.
• The set of messages M is finite, such that | M |≥| K |.
• The set of decisions X is compact.4 As a typical example, X ⊂ Rn2 ,
for some n2 ≥ 1; for instance, player 2 has a finite set of actions A and
X = ∆(A) corresponds to the set of mixed strategies of player 2.
• The utility functions Uk : X → R and V k : X → R are continuous; for
instance, if X = ∆(A), Uk and V k may correspond to expected utility.
We further assume that:
• For every k ∈ K, there exists x ∈ X such that Uk(x) ≥ uk0.
• For every k ∈ K, for every x ∈ X , V k(x) ≥ v0, namely,
v0 ≤ mink∈K minx∈X V
k(x).
3We do not make any assumption beyond the fact that there are finitely many types;
in particular, types can be “multidimensional,” with K ⊂ Rn1 , for some n1 ≥ 1.
4We will indicate explicitly when X will be required to be convex.
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We are interested in situations in which the sender’s approval is crucial
to the receiver, namely, in which v0 can be arbitrarily low. Let us denote as
Γ the “limit game,” in which v0 = −∞. We will show that Γ is a tractable
tool, which is appropriate to study Γ(v0) when v0 is small enough.
Let us set, for every L ⊆ K
X(L) =
{
x ∈ X : Uk(x) ≥ uk0, k ∈ L
}
. (1)
Given a subset of types L, X(L) is the set of decisions that are acceptable
by all types in L. We write X(k) for X({k}), so that X(L) =
⋂
k∈L
X(k).
2.2 Equilibria
Our solution concept, in Γ(v0) and Γ, is basically subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium, but perfect Bayesian equilibrium would not be more demanding:
as in standard sender-receiver games, finding beliefs rationalizing player 2’s
choices is not an issue. What is crucial here is to avoid non-credible threats
from player 1. In the sequel, we simply refer to “equilibrium.”
At a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, player 1 of type k accepts (resp.,
rejects) player 2’s proposal x when Uk(x) > uk0 (resp., U
k(x) < uk0). We
further assume that player 1 accepts the proposal when he is indifferent,
which is consistent with our interest in situations in which player 2 strictly
prefers that player 1 participates. By proceeding backwards, Γ(v0) amounts
to a standard sender-receiver game, with the following utility functions (in
which I denotes the indicator function):
Uk+(x) = U
k(x)I(Uk(x) ≥ uk0) + u
k
0I(U
k(x) < uk0) = max
{
Uk(x), uk0
}
(2)
for player 1 of type k and
W k(v0, x) = V
k(x)I(Uk(x) ≥ uk0) + v0I(U
k(x) < uk0). (3)
for player 2, when player 1 is of type k.5 In the latter sender-receiver game,
the receiver’s utility function is not necessarily continuous, but it is upper-
semi-continuous.
5This observation is made in Chen, Nartik and Sobel (2008), in their account of
Matthews (1989).
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Lemma 1. For every k ∈ K and v0 ∈ R, the utility function W
k(v0, ·)
defined by (3) is upper-semi-continuous.
Proof: Let xn ∈ X , xn → x. The only possibly delicate case is when
Uk(xn) < u
k
0 for every n and U
k(x) = uk0. Then W
k(v0, xn) = v0 ≤ V
k(x) =
W k(v0, x), using our assumption. 
Having determined player 1’s behavior at the approval stage, we can
define a strategy for player 1 (in Γ(v0) and Γ) as a mapping σ : K → ∆(M).
We interpret σ(k)(m) as the probability that player 1 sends message m when
his type is k, and denote it as σ(m | k). We adopt the following notations:
For every m ∈M , Pσ(m) =
∑
k
pkσ(m | k). (4)
For every k ∈ K and m ∈M s.t. Pσ(m) > 0, p
k
m(σ) =
pkσ(m | k)
Pσ(m)
. (5)
pkm(σ) is thus the posterior probability of type k computed from p and σ; let
pm(σ) = (p
k
m(σ))k∈K denote the corresponding posterior probability distri-
bution over K. We have
∑
m
Pσ(m)pm(σ) = p.
We say that σ is nonrevealing if player 1 sends his message in a type-
independent way, namely, if σ(m | k) = σ(m | k′) for every m ∈ M , k,
k′ ∈ K. In this case, pm(σ) = p for every m s.t. Pσ(m) > 0.
For player 2, a strategy is a mapping τ : M → X , namely, a “pure”
strategy with respect to the set X (but as indicated above, X = ∆(A) for a
finite set of actions A is a particular case).6
We say that (σ, τ) is “without exit” if
Uk(τ(m)) ≥ uk0 ∀k ∈ K, ∀m ∈M s.t. σ(m | k) > 0, (6)
namely, if
Uk+(τ(m)) = U
k(τ(m)) ∀k ∈ K, ∀m ∈M s.t. σ(m | k) > 0.
Recalling (1) and denoting by supp q the support of a probability distribution
q ∈ ∆(K), condition (6) is equivalent to
τ(m) ∈ X(supp pm(σ)) ∀m ∈M s.t. Pσ(m) > 0. (7)
6Restriction to pure strategies of player 2 is justified by the fact that these will be
enough to establish existence of equilibria in Γ.
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At an equilibrium of Γ, we require that player 2’s expected utility be finite
(> −∞). Hence an equilibrium of Γ is necessarily without exit. By contrast,
an equilibrium of Γ(v0) may involve exit of some types.
Proposition 2. For every v0 ∈ R, the game Γ(v0) has a nonrevealing equi-
librium (possibly with exit). The game Γ has a nonrevealing equilibrium if
and only if X(K) 6= ∅. Hence Γ may not have any nonrevealing equilibrium.
Proof: The following strategies define a nonrevealing equilibrium in Γ(v0):
player 1 sends the same message m ∈M whatever his type and then accepts
x if and only if Uk(x) ≥ uk0; whatever the message, player 2 chooses x
∗ ∈ X
to maximize
∑
k p
kW k(v0, x), which is well-defined thanks to Lemma 1.
In Γ, if X(K) 6= ∅, a nonrevealing equilibrium can be achieved as above,
provided that player 2 chooses x∗ ∈ X to maximize
∑
k p
kV k(x) subject
to x ∈ X(K). If X(K) = ∅ and player 1’s message is type-independent,
condition (7) cannot be satisfied. 
The next two propositions (which are established in Section 6.1) give
us some foundations to study the equilibria of the limit game Γ by making
precise relationships between the latter and the equilibria without exit of
Γ(v0).
Proposition 3. Let (σ, τ) be an equilibrium without exit in Γ(v0), for some
v0 ∈ R. Then (σ, τ) is an equilibrium without exit in Γ(z0) for every z0 ∈ R
such that z0 ≤ v0 and is also an equilibrium in Γ, with the same interim
expected utility as in Γ(v0) for both players.
In other words, if Γ has no a equilibrium (which indeed may happen, see
Section 4.3), then, whatever v0 ∈ R, Γ(v0) has no equilibrium without exit,
that is, all equilibria of Γ(v0) must involve non-participation of at least one
type.
Proposition 4. Let (σ, τ) be an equilibrium in Γ. Then there exists v0 ∈ R
such that, for every z0 ≤ v0, (σ, τ) is an equilibrium without exit of Γ(z0),
with the same interim expected utility as in Γ for both players.
The previous properties are useful under a mechanism design perspective.
Assume player 2 is a “principal” who cannot commit to a mechanism µ :
K → X but receives a message from the agent (player 1) and then, makes
a decision in X subject to the agent’s participation constraints. With this
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interpretation, which turns out to be an extreme case of Bester and Strausz
(2001)’s model, an optimal mechanism amounts to an equilibrium of Γ(v0)
which maximizes player 2’s ex ante expected utility. At a given v0, the
equilibrium of Γ(v0) that is best for player 2 may involve the exit of some
types of player 1. By contrast, player 2’s best equilibrium payoff in the limit
game Γ, when it exists, is achieved at an equilibrium (σ∗, τ ∗) without exit.
Let us denote player 2’s corresponding payoff as v∗NE. By Proposition 4, if
v0 is small enough, (σ
∗, τ ∗) is an equilibrium without exit in Γ(v0), giving
the same expected utility v∗NE to player 2. By Proposition 3, v
∗
NE is the
best equilibrium payoff player 2 can achieve at an equilibrium without exit in
Γ(v0). Moreover, as we show in details in Section 6.1, if v0 is sufficiently low,
player 2 cannot expect an expected utility higher than v∗NE at an equilibrium
of Γ(v0) with exit of some types.
7 Summing up, if the limit game Γ has an
equilibrium, an optimal mechanism, when the principal’s utility v0 in case
of exit is sufficiently low, can be found by maximizing player 2’s utility over
the equilibria of Γ, without worrying about the precise level v0.
3 Existence of a partitional equilibrium in Γ
In this section, we focus on the game Γ. We identify various sufficient con-
ditions for the existence of a partitional equilibrium in Γ, in which player 1
uses a pure strategy, namely a mapping σ : K →M , to send his message to
player 2. The strategy σ then induces the partition {Km, m ∈ σ(K)} of K,
with Km = σ
−1(m) = {k ∈ K : σ(k) = m}. In this case, (4) and (5) become
respectively:
For every m ∈ M , Pσ(m) =
∑
k∈Km
pk. (8)
For every k ∈ K and m ∈M s.t. Pσ(m) > 0, p
k
m(σ) =
pkI(k ∈ Km)
Pσ(m)
. (9)
As in Section 2, for player 2, we focus on strategies of the form τ : M →
X . At an equilibrium of Γ, given player 1’s strategy σ and the message m
he receives, player 2 updates his belief over K into pm(σ). To avoid exit, we
must have
7The observation that the principal’s ex ante expected utility is maximized when all
types of the agent participate is also made in Bester and Strausz (2001), footnote 8.
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X(supp pm(σ)) 6= ∅ (10)
Player 2’s strategy τ is then a best response to σ in Γ if and only if
∀m ∈M s.t. Pσ(m) > 0, τ(m) ∈ arg max
x∈X(supp pm(σ))
∑
k
pkm(σ)V
k(x). (11)
We refer to these conditions as to constrained optimization.
Player 1’s equilibrium conditions reduce to incentive compatibility con-
ditions expressing that given player 2’s strategy τ , player 1 of type k prefers
to send σ(k) than any other message m, namely,
Uk (τ(σ(k)))) ≥ Uk (τ(m)) for every k ∈ K and m ∈M . (12)
3.1 Two types
If only two types are possible, we show that either there is a decision giving
both types at least their reservation utility or full revelation of information
is credible and allows to avoid exit.
Proposition 5. Let us assume that | K |= 2. Then Γ has a partitional
equilibrium.
Proof: If X(1) ∩X(2) 6= ∅, let
x∗ ∈ arg max
x∈X(1)∩X(2)
[
p1V 1(x) + p2V 2(x)
]
and let m∗ be an arbitrary element of M . Then σ(1) = σ(2) = m∗ and
τ(m) = x∗ for every m ∈M defines a nonrevealing equilibrium of Γ.
Otherwise, if X(1) ∩X(2) = ∅, let
xk ∈ arg max
x∈X(k)
V k(x) k = 1, 2
and let m1 6= m2 be two distinct elements of M . Then σ(k) = mk, τ(mk) =
xk, k = 1, 2, defines a fully revealing equilibrium of Γ. Indeed, constrained
optimization (11) holds by construction; to see that incentive compatibility
(12) also holds, observe that xk ∈ X(k). Hence xk /∈ X(ℓ) for ℓ 6= k, since
X(1) ∩X(2) = ∅. In other words, U ℓ(xk) < u
ℓ
0 ≤ U
ℓ(xℓ) for ℓ 6= k. 
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3.2 Straightforward partitional equilibria
In this section, we propose an easy generalization of Proposition 5 when the
sender has an arbitrary number of types. Recalling the definition of X(L)
(see (1)), let us set
T = {∅ 6= L ⊆ K : X(L) 6= ∅}
and define T ∗ as the set of maximal elements of T for set inclusion, namely,
T ∗ = {L ∈ T : [L′ ∈ T and L ⊆ L′]⇒ L′ = L} . (13)
We refer to T ∗ as to the “participation structure” of the game Γ.
Proposition 6. If the participation structure of Γ is a partition of K, Γ has
a partitional equilibrium.
Proof:
Let T ∗ = {Kr}. Consider the strategy of player 1 consisting of revealing
the cell Kr containing his type. Let x
∗
r ∈ X(Kr) be an optimal decision of
player 2 when he learns that player 1’s type belongs Kr, namely,
x∗r ∈ arg max
x∈X(Kr)
∑
k∈Kr
pk∑
j∈Kr
pj
V k(x).
Constrained optimization (11) holds by construction. Incentive compatibility
(12) is also immediate, because if k ∈ Kr, x
∗
r ∈ X(Kr) while for j 6= r,
x∗j /∈ X(Kr). 
3.3 Decision in a real interval and monotonic utility
function for the sender
The next result holds in particular when player 2’s decision can be interpreted
as a probability distribution over two possible actions (i.e., X = ∆(A),| A |=
2) and the utility Uk(x) of player 1 of type k is expected utility with respect
to x.
Proposition 7. Let us assume that the decision set X is a real interval
and every utility function Uk, k ∈ K, is monotonic over X. Then Γ has a
partitional equilibrium.
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Proof:
Let us take, without loss of generality, X = [0, 1]; define
K− =
{
k ∈ K : Uk is weakly decreasing and not constant
}
K+ =
{
k ∈ K : Uk is weakly increasing or constant
}
We can find xk0, k ∈ K, such that if k ∈ K−, U
k(x) ≥ uk0 ⇔ x ≤ x
k
0 and if
k ∈ K+, U
k(x) ≥ uk0 ⇔ x ≥ x
k
0. We define next
x− = mink∈K− x
k
0 if K− 6= ∅ ; x− = 1 if K− = ∅.
x+ = maxk∈K+ x
k
0 if K+ 6= ∅ ; x+ = 0 if K+ = ∅.
If x+ ≤ x− (in particular, if K− or K+ = ∅), let
x∗ ∈ arg max
[x+,x−]
∑
k∈K
pkV k(x)
and let m∗ be an arbitrary element of M . Then σ(k) = m∗ for every k ∈ K
and τ(m) = x∗ for every m ∈M defines a nonrevealing equilibrium of Γ.
If x+ > x−, let m
∗
− 6= m
∗
+ be two distinct elements of M . Take σ(k) =
m∗− if k ∈ K−, σ(k) = m
∗
+ if k ∈ K+, namely, σ induces the partition
{K−, K+}. Player 2’s corresponding posterior probability distribution on K
can be computed as in (9):
pkm∗
−
=
pkI(k ∈ K−)∑
j∈K−
pj
and pkm∗
+
=
pkI(k ∈ K+)∑
j∈K+
pj
.
Let then
x∗− ∈ arg max
[0,x−]
∑
k∈K−
pkm∗
−
V k(x) and x∗+ ∈ arg max
[x+,1]
∑
k∈K+
pkm∗
+
V k(x).
Constrained optimization (11) holds by construction. There remains to check
incentive compatibility (12). Observe that x∗− < x
∗
+; for k ∈ K−, U
k is
decreasing, hence Uk(x∗−) ≥ U
k(x∗+). Similarly for k ∈ K+, U
k is increasing
so that Uk(x∗−) ≤ U
k(x∗+). 
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3.4 Type-independent utility function for the receiver
In this section, we assume that, when the sender accepts the receiver’s pro-
posal, the utility function of the receiver does not depend on the sender’s
type, namely, that V k(x) = V (x) for every k and x. This assumption is
sometimes referred to as “private values” or “known-own payoff.” Matthews
(1989) formulates it in the context of a game of information transmission
with sender’s approval.
Theorem 8. Let us assume that player 2’s utility function does not depend
on player 1’s type, namely, that there exists a continuous function V : X → R
such that V k = V for every k ∈ K. Then Γ has a partitional equilibrium.
The proof consists of an algorithm, which constructs a partitional equi-
librium that is as revealing as possible, given the incentive compatibility
constraints to be fulfilled. More precisely, the initial candidate is the fully
revealing equilibrium. Imagine that type k would envy type ℓ if one tried to
implement fully revealing strategies, while type ℓ would not envy any type.
By merging type ℓ and type k, one reduces the incentives problem. A key
property is that, if player 2’s utility function is independent of player 1’s
type, then player 2’s optimal decision xℓ when facing type ℓ remains optimal
when facing type ℓ or type k. Before making use of it, we first show, by
relying on the same kind of argument, that the envy relation cannot have
any cycle.
Proof:
Let us fix, for every k ∈ K,
xk ∈ arg max
x∈X(k)
V (x). (14)
The existence of such xk’s is guaranteed by our assumptions. If the previous
optimization problem has several solutions, we take xk to maximize U
k(x).
For every pair of types j, k ∈ K, we say that “type k envies type j” –
and write kRj – if Uk(xj) > U
k(xk). An immediate property is that
for every j, k ∈ K, kRj ⇒ V (xk) > V (xj). (15)
To show this, observe that, by definition, xk ∈ X(k), i.e., U
k(xk) ≥ u
k
0.
Hence, if kRj, we must have Uk(xj) > u
k
0, which implies xj ∈ X(k) (so that
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xj ∈ X(j)∩X(k)) and V (xk) ≥ V (xj). But V (xk) = V (xj) cannot arise, be-
cause Uk(xj) > U
k(xk) and, in case of multiple solutions to maxx∈X(k) V (x),
we choose xk to maximize U
k(x).
The previous property implies that the envy relation R has no cycle.
We will gradually construct a subset L ⊆ K of leader types which do not
envy any other type in L and a subset F = K \ L of follower types which
envy a type in L.
We start with L = F = ∅. Let us denote as α1 < · · · < αn the distinct
values among V (xk), k ∈ K. Necessarily, n ≤| K |. Define then
Kj = {k ∈ K : V (xk) = αj} j = 1, ..., n. (16)
Step 1 Consider every type k ∈ K1: V (xk) = α1 is strictly below any other
αj. By (15), type k cannot envy any other type. We modify L into
L = K1, while F does not change (F = ∅).
Step 2 Consider every type k ∈ K2. If k does not envy any type, put k in
L. Otherwise, again by (15), k can only envy a type in L (as defined
at the end of step 1, namely, K1), put k in F .
· · ·
Step j Let L and F be the sets of leaders and followers constructed so far.
L∪F = K1∪· · ·∪Kj−1 so that by (15) and (16), types in L∪F cannot
envy types in Kj. Consider every such type k ∈ Kj . If k envies a type
in L, put k in F . Otherwise, put k in L. L and F are thus updated at
the end of step j.
· · ·
Step n Proceed as for step j. Deduce the final sets of leaders and followers.
For instance, if | K |= 3 and R is fully described by 3R2 and 2R1, the
previous construction results in K1 = {1}, K2 = {2}, K3 = {3}, L = {1, 3}.
Using the xk’s defined by (14) and the set L, we construct an equilibrium
(σ, τ) of Γ. For simplicity, we rename the messages in M so that L ⊆ M .
Player 1’s strategy is such that σ(K) = L. More precisely, σ : K → L is
defined by
σ(k) = k if k ∈ L
argmaxj∈L,kRj U
k(xj) if k ∈ K \ L.
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In other words, leader types announce themselves, while non leader types
report the leader type they most envy. Player 2’s strategy is defined by τ :
L→ X : τ(ℓ) = xℓ, with xℓ defined by (14).
Incentive compatibility (12) follows from the fact that player 2’s strategy
τ restricts his decisions to the subset {xℓ, ℓ ∈ L}. Hence types in L, who
cannot envy any other type in L, are truthful. Types in K \L behave as well
as they can given the player 2’s restricted decision set.
If player 1 follows σ, then, given message ℓ ∈ L, player 2 deduces that
player 1’s type k ∈ σ−1(ℓ). The set σ−1(ℓ) contains ℓ, xℓ ∈ X(ℓ) by (14)
and all other types in σ−1(ℓ) envy ℓ, so that xℓ ∈
⋂
k∈σ−1(ℓ)X(k). Since
xℓ is a maximizer of V (x) over X(ℓ), it is also a maximizer of V (x) over⋂
k∈σ−1(ℓ)X(k). 
Remarks:
- A main feature of the proof of Theorem 8 is that, in the partitional equi-
librium that is constructed, the receiver makes a decision in a subset of
{xk, k ∈ K} where xk is the optimal decision he would make if he were
sure to face type k. The receiver’s private values guarantee that if type
k envies type ℓ, then xℓ, the receiver’s optimal choice when he faces type
ℓ for sure (i.e., under the constraint x ∈ X(ℓ)), is still optimal when he
faces type k or type ℓ (i.e., under the constraint x ∈ X(ℓ)∩X(k)). This
property may no longer hold when player 2’s utility is type-dependent.
- Theorem 8 does not depend on the underlying utility representation: the re-
sult holds if the receiver’s von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences over
X given type k are equivalent for every k ∈ K.
4 Examples (including a counter-example)
4.1 Partitional equilibrium
Let the informed player have three possible types, i.e., K = {1, 2, 3} and let
the uninformed player’s decision set be
X = {(xa, xb) : xa ≥ 0, xb ≥ 0, xa + xb ≤ 100} .
Let the utility function and reservation utility of the informed player be
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U1(x) = xa − xb u
1
0 = 30,
U2(x) = xb − xa u
2
0 = 40,
U3(x) = xa + 2xb u
3
0 = 20.
Let the uninformed player’s utility function be type-independent:
V k(x) = V (x) = −(xa + xb), k = 1, 2, 3.
There are two goods, a and b, X accounts for the decision-maker’s re-
source constraints. Type 1 likes good a, dislikes good b; type 2 has symmetric
preferences; type 3 likes both goods, and likes good b more than good a.
As a possible interpretation, player 1 is a kidnapper who can have po-
litical motivations (type 1), just look for a monetary ransom (type 2) or be
opportunistic (type 3). Good a stands for political prisoners who can be re-
leased while good b stands for money. If player 1 does not accept player 2’s
offer, the hostage is killed, leading to an invaluable loss for player 2.
Recalling (1) and using “Co” for convex hull, we have here
X({1}) = X({1, 3}) = Co {(30, 0), (100, 0), (65, 35)} ,
X({2}) = X({2, 3}) = Co {(0, 40), (0, 100), (30, 70)} ,
X({3}) = Co {(20, 0), (100, 0), (0, 100), (0, 10)} ,
X({1, 2}) = X({1, 2, 3}) = ∅.
Assume first that player 1’s type k is known, namely, that pk = 1. Let
then x∗k be the uninformed player’s optimal decision (in X) when he faces
type k:
x∗1 = (30, 0), x
∗
2 = (0, 40), x
∗
3 = (0, 10). (17)
Suppose next that only two types are possible. If p1 = 0, given that
X({2, 3}) 6= ∅, there is a nonrevealing equilibrium, x∗2 = (0, 40). Similarly
for p2 = 0, with x∗1 = (30, 0). If p
3 = 0, there is no way to satisfy type 1
and type 2 at the same time. But there is a completely revealing equilibrium:
x∗1 = (30, 0) to type 1, x
∗
2 = (0, 40) to type 2 is incentive compatible. This
illustrates Proposition 5.
Let the three types be possible, namely pk > 0 for k = 1, 2, 3. There is
no nonrevealing equilibrium, since X({1, 2, 3}) = ∅. There is no completely
revealing equilibrium either: (17) implies that type 3 would pretend to be
type 2 (type 3 envies type 1 and type 2 even more).
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As expected from Theorem 8, there exists a partitional equilibrium. The
informed player is invited to report whether his type is 1 or not. If he reports
type 1, the uninformed player proposes x∗1 = (30, 0). If the informed player
reports that his type is not 1, the uninformed player proposes
arg min
x∈X({2,3})
(xa + xb) = x
∗
2 = (0, 40).
As in the proof of Theorem 8, incentive compatibility is ensured by the fact
that the decision proposed to type 3 is the one he most envies among x∗1 and
x∗2.
4.2 Mixed equilibrium
Let us modify the uninformed player’s utility function in the previous exam-
ple, to make it depend on the informed player’s type:
V 1(x) =
xa
3
,
V 2(x) =
xb
3
,
V 3(x) = −(xa + xb).
A possible interpretation is that the decision-maker is happy to pay when
the kidnapper has sharp preferences.
Let as above x∗k denote the uninformed player’s optimal decision (in X)
when he faces type k; we have now
x∗1 = (100, 0), x
∗
2 = (0, 100), x
∗
3 = (0, 10). (18)
Let us take p = (1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
). There is no nonrevealing equilibrium, since
X({1, 2, 3}) = ∅. There is no completely revealing equilibrium: given (18),
type 3 would pretend to be type 2. More generally, there is no partitional
equilibrium. Given the above description of the sets X(L), two possible par-
titions must still be considered: {{1} , {2, 3}} and {{1, 3} , {2}}.
{{1} , {2, 3}}: if the uninformed player believes he faces type 1 (posterior
(1, 0, 0)), his optimal choice is x∗1 = (100, 0); if he believes he faces type 2 or
type 3 (posterior (0, 1
2
, 1
2
)), his optimal choice is
x∗23 = arg min
x∈X({2,3})
[
xa +
2
3
xb
]
= (0, 40).
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This cannot be incentive compatible for type 3:
100 = U3(x∗1) > U
3(x∗23) = 80.
{{1, 3} , {2}}: if the uninformed player believes he faces type 2 (posterior
(0, 1, 0)), his optimal choice is x∗2 = (0, 100); if he believes he faces type 1 or
type 3 (posterior (1
2
, 0, 1
2
)), his optimal choice is
x∗13 = arg min
x∈X({1,3})
[
2
3
xa + xb
]
= (100, 0).
Again, this cannot be incentive compatible for type 3:
200 = U3(x∗2) > U
3(x∗13) = 100.
This illustrates that Theorem 8 does not extend to the case where player 2’s
utility function depends on player 1’s type.
Let us show that if player 1 uses a mixed strategy, a partially revealing
equilibrium exists in this example: type 1 reports that his type belongs to
{1, 3}, type 2 reports that his type belongs to {2, 3}, type 3 reports that
his type belongs to {1, 3} (resp., {2, 3}) with probability 1
3
(resp., 2
3
). If the
informed player follows this reporting strategy, the uninformed player’s poste-
rior upon receiving {1, 3} is (3
4
, 0, 1
4
) while upon receiving {2, 3}, it is (0, 3
5
, 2
5
).
Given {1, 3}, the uninformed player’s problem reduces to minx∈X({1,3}) xb. Ev-
ery x = (xa, 0) with xa ∈ [30, 100] is optimal. Let us take x
∗
13 = (80, 0). Given
{2, 3}, the uninformed player’s optimal choice is
x∗23 = arg min
x∈X({2,3})
[2xa + xb] = (0, 40).
There remains to check incentive compatibility. Type 1 prefers x∗13 = (80, 0)
to x∗23 = (0, 40), and vice-versa for type 2. Type 3 must be indifferent
between sending {1, 3} or {2, 3}, because he must randomize between these
two outcomes. Indeed we have U3(x∗13) = U
3(x∗23) = 80. Proposition 9 in
Section 5 states that the previous construction can be generalized.
4.3 No equilibrium at all
In the following example, none of the existence results of Section 3 can be
applied. We will show that there is no equilibrium, even if player 1 makes use
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of a mixed strategy. The game is described by:| K |= 3, X = ∆(A), where
A = {a, b, c}, uk0 = 0, k = 1, 2, 3. The following payoff matrices describe
(Uk(α), V k(α)) for every α ∈ A:
a b c
k = 1 0, 2 −2, 0 1, 1
k = 2 1, 1 0, 2 −2, 0
k = 3 −2, 0 1, 1 0, 2
The utility functions over X = ∆(A) are obtained as expected utilities
with respect to x = (xa, xb, xc).
If player 2 knows that he faces type k (i.e., pk = 1), he gets his first best
by choosing a if k = 1, b if k = 2, c if k = 3. But if pk > 0 for every k, there
is no nonrevealing equilibrium (
∑
k U
k(x) < 0 for every x ∈ ∆(A)) and no
fully revealing equilibrium (incentive compatibility is violated).
Looking for a partially revealing equilibrium, we first check that there is
a unique, nonrevealing equilibrium, as soon as only two types are possible.
Take, e.g., p3 = 0. Then
X({1, 2}) = {x ∈ X : −2xb + xc ≥ 0 and xa − 2xc ≥ 0}
= Co
{
(1, 0, 0), (
2
3
, 0,
1
3
), (
4
7
,
1
7
,
2
7
)
}
and player 2’s optimization problem is:
max p1(2xa + xc) + p
2(xa + 2xb) s.t. x ∈ X({1, 2}).
For every p such that p1 > 0 and p2 > 0, the unique solution is achieved at
x = (1, 0, 0), namely, action a with probability 1. Similarly, action b is the
only solution if p2 > 0 and p3 > 0, action c is the only solution if p1 > 0 and
p3 > 0.
Let us start with p such that pk > 0 for every k. By sending his message
according to a mixed strategy σ, player 1 “splits” the prior belief p into
posteriors pm(σ) such that
∑
m
Pσ(m)pm(σ) = p (see (5)). Taking account
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of incentive compatibility, p cannot be split (only) extreme points, because
there is no fully revealing equilibrium. At least one of the posteriors pm must
be on an edge, say p3m = 0, so that τ(m) = a. There should be another
posterior pm′ with p
3
m′ > 0, with τ(m
′) = b or c. To achieve the posteriors pm
and pm′ , message m must be sent with positive probability by types 1 and
2, while message m′ must be sent with positive probability by at least type
3. If τ(m′) = b, type 2 strictly prefers m′ to m. If x(m′) = c, type 1 strictly
prefers m′ to m. Hence there is no incentive compatible splitting and thus
no equilibrium at all, even if player 1 can use a mixed strategy.
A mediated equilibrium, in which information transmission is monitored
by a mediator, can nevertheless be achieved in the previous example. Con-
sider the following three lotteries over A: δ1 = (1
2
, 0, 1
2
), δ2 = (1
2
, 1
2
, 0),
δ3 = (0, 1
2
, 1
2
). Assume that, instead of selecting a message by himself, player
1 can just choose among these three lotteries. If player 1 expects player 2
to pick the action selected by the lottery, player 1 prefers δk over the other
two lotteries when his type is k. Similarly, player 2 is happy to choose the
action recommended by the lottery if he believes that player 1 reveals his
type truthfully to the mediator. This procedure will be generalized in the
next section.
5 Equilibrium in the case of three types
In this section, we propose a thorough analysis of the equilibria of Γ when
player 1 has three possible types (| K |= 3). Recall that T ∗ denotes the
participation structure of Γ (see (1) and (13)).
When | K |= 3, there are three typical cases:
1. T ∗ is a partition of K.
2. T ∗ = {{1, 2} , {1, 3} , {2, 3}}.
3. T ∗ = {{1, 3} , {2, 3}}.
In case 1, by Proposition 6, Γ has a partitional equilibrium. Case 2 means
that player 2 is able to obtain the approval of every pair of types but cannot
ensure the participation of the three types simultaneously. In this case, as
illustrated in Section 4.3, Γ may have no mixed equilibrium. We will show
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below that Γ always has a mediated equilibrium. In case 3, which has been
illustrated in Section 4.2., player 2 can only guarantee the approval of two
pairs of types. We will establish that under further assumptions, Γ always
has then a mixed (possibly not pure) equilibrium.
5.1 T ∗ = {{1, 2} , {1, 3} , {2, 3}}
Let us enrich the description of Γ by adding a mediator who invites player 1
to report a type (inK) and then selects a decision (inX) that he recommends
player 2. At a mediated equilibrium, player 1 truthfully reveals his type to the
mediator, player 2 proposes to player 1 the decision x that is recommended
by the mediator and finally, player 1 of type k accepts player 2’s proposal x′
provided that Uk(x′) ≥ uk0.
Let us construct a mediated equilibrium in Γ when K = {1, 2, 3} and
T ∗ = {{1, 2} , {1, 3} , {2, 3}}. Recall that pk > 0 for every k. For every pair
(j, k) of types, let x∗jk ∈ X({j, k}) be an optimal decision for player 2 when
he learns that player 1 is of type j or k, namely,
x∗jk ∈ argmax
[
pj
pj + pk
V j(x) +
pk
pj + pk
V k(x)
]
. (19)
Consider the following mediator: for every k = 1, 2, 3, if player 1 reports
type k, he selects x∗ik or x
∗
jk, i, j 6= k, i 6= j, with equal probability
1
2
and
recommends it to player 2. If player 1 reports his type k truthfully, player 2
learns, with equal probability, that player 1’s type is in {i, k} or in {j, k} for
i, j 6= k, i 6= j. Condition (19) guarantees that player 2 follows the mediator’s
recommendation.
For player 1, let us consider k = 1. By reporting his type truthfully, player
1 obtains
1
2
U1(x∗12) +
1
2
U1(x∗13).
If he lies by, say, pretending to be of type 2, he obtains8
U12 =
1
2
max
{
U1(x∗12), u
1
0
}
+
1
2
max
{
U1(x∗23), u
1
0
}
.
8Player 1’s incentive compatibility condition reflects the fact that this player can veto
player 2’s offer, namely, can lie about his type and/or reject player 2’s proposal. This is a
“veto-incentive compatibility condition” (see, e.g., Forges (1999)), which implies posterior
individual rationality.
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By construction, x∗12 ∈ X({1, 2}) and x
∗
13 ∈ X({1, 3}). Hence U
1(x∗12) ≥ u
1
0
and U1(x∗13) ≥ u
1
0. But x
∗
23 /∈ X(1) because {2, 3} is maximal. Hence,
U1(x∗23) < u
1
0.
U12 =
1
2
U1(x∗12) +
1
2
u10 ≤
1
2
U1(x∗12) +
1
2
U1(x∗13).
The other incentive compatibility conditions of player 1 can be checked in a
symmetric way. 
5.2 T ∗ = {{1, 3} , {2, 3}}
Proposition 9. Let us assume that K = {1, 2, 3}, the participation structure
T ∗ = {{1, 3} , {2, 3}}, the decision set X is compact and convex and the util-
ity functions Uk and V k, k ∈ K, are affine. Then Γ has a partially revealing
equilibrium, in which player 1 uses a mixed, possibly not pure, strategy.
Proof: See Section 6.2. We establish that there must exist an equilibrium in
which type 1 reports that his type belongs to {1, 3}, type 2 reports that his
type belongs to {2, 3} and type 3 reports that his type belongs to {1, 3} (resp.,
{2, 3}) with some probability δ ∈ (0, 1) (resp., 1−δ). Incentive compatibility
requires that type 3 be indifferent between reporting {1, 3} or {2, 3}. Such
an equilibrium is shown to be the only possible one in the example of Section
4.2.
6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Propositions 3 and 4
For the sake of completeness, we first explicitly recall the conditions to be
satisfied by an equilibrium of Γ(v0) whether they involve exit of some types
on equilibrium path or not.
Let us fix a pair of strategies σ : K → ∆(M) and τ :M → X . Player 1’s
equilibrium conditions can be written as
Uk+(τ(m)) ≥ U
k
+(τ(m
′)) ∀k ∈ K, ∀m ∈M s.t. σ(m | k) > 0, ∀m′ ∈M .
(20)
Player 2’s equilibrium conditions can be written as∑
k
pkm(σ)W
k(v0, τ(m)) ≥
∑
k
pkm(σ)W
k(v0, x) ∀m ∈ M s.t. Pσ(m) > 0, ∀x ∈ X .
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We deduce that the necessary and sufficient conditions for (σ, τ) to be an
equilibrium without exit are:
For player 1:
Uk(τ(m)) ≥ Uk(τ(m′)) ∀k ∈ K, ∀m ∈M s.t. σ(m | k) > 0, ∀m′ ∈M , (21)
implying that
Uk(τ(m)) = Uk(τ(m′)) ∀m,m′ ∈M s.t. σ(m | k) > 0 and σ(m′ | k) > 0.
For player 2:
τ(m) ∈
[
argmax
x∈X
∑
k
pkm(σ)W
k(v0, x)
]
∩X(supp pm(σ)), (22)
implying constrained optimization, namely (11).
Recall that by definition, an equilibrium of Γ cannot involve exit, so that
the conditions for (σ, τ) to be an equilibrium in Γ are thus just (21) and (11).
Remarks on (21):
• As a refinement of subgame perfect equilibrium, Matthews (1989) strength-
ens (20) to (21) in the case of equilibria which typically involve exit on
path.
• For an equilibrium without exit, player 1’s equilibrium conditions take
the simple form (21) because player 2’s strategy τ is pure. In an equi-
librium without exit, for every k ∈ K, player 1’s equilibrium strategy
consists of sending m, selected with probability σ(m | k), and then
accept player 2’s proposal, namely, τ(m), which is fully anticipated at
the time to choose m. A deviation consists of sending m′ ∈M (possibly
such that σ(m′ | k) = 0) and then, accept or reject player 2’s proposal
τ(m′). Player 1’s equilibrium conditions thus take the form
Uk(τ(m)) ≥ max
{
Uk(τ(m′)), uk0
}
∀k ∈ K, ∀m ∈M s.t. σ(m | k) > 0, ∀m′ ∈M .
These are equivalent to (21), since (6) holds at an equilibrium without
exit. If player 2’s strategy τ were mixed (τ : M → ∆(X)), we would
have to write9∑
x
τ(x | m)Uk(x) ≥
∑
x
τ(x | m′)max
{
Uk(x)), uk0
}
.
9The expression is similar to “veto-incentive compatibility” (see, e.g., Forges (1999))
and implies posterior individual rationality.
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Proposition 3. Let (σ, τ) be an equilibrium without exit in Γ(v0), for some
v0 ∈ R. Then (σ, τ) is an equilibrium without exit in Γ(z0) for every z0 ∈ R
such that z0 ≤ v0 and is also an equilibrium in Γ, with the same interim
expected utility as in Γ(v0) for both players.
Proof: If (σ, τ) satisfies (22) in Γ(v0), the same holds in Γ(z0) since for every
x ∈ X , ∑
k
pkm(σ)W
k(z0, x) ≤
∑
k
pkm(σ)W
k(v0, x)
and for every x ∈ X(supp pm(σ)),∑
k
pkm(σ)W
k(z0, x) =
∑
k
pkm(σ)W
k(v0, x) =
∑
k
pkm(σ)V
k(x).
Furthermore, (11) must hold and player 1’s equilibrium conditions (21)
are the same in Γ(v0) and Γ(z0) or Γ as long as player 2’s strategy remains
unchanged. 
Proposition 4. Let (σ, τ) be an equilibrium in Γ. Then there exists v0 ∈ R
such that, for every z0 ≤ v0, (σ, τ) is an equilibrium without exit of Γ(z0),
with the same interim expected utility as in Γ for both players.
Proof: Let (σ, τ) be an equilibrium without exit in Γ. By definition, con-
strained optimization (11) holds, so that in particular τ(m) ∈ X(supp pm(σ))
for every m such that Pσ(m) > 0. Let us keep player 1’s strategy, σ,
fixed. Player 2’s strategy τ remains a best reply to σ in Γ(v0), with v0 ≤
mink∈K minx∈X V
k(x), provided that v0 is such that optimality of no exit
holds, namely, recalling (22),
∀m ∈M s.t. Pσ(m) > 0,
∑
k
pkm(σ)V
k(τ(m)) ≥ max
x∈X
∑
k
pkm(σ)W
k(v0, x).
These can be viewed as finitely many inequalities over v0,which have a solu-
tion in R, since the RHS are well-defined, for every v0 ≤ mink∈K minx∈X V
k(x),
by Lemma 1.10 Hence there exists v0 such that (σ, τ) is an equilibrium with-
out exit of Γ(v0) and from Proposition 3, in Γ(z0), for every z0 ≤ v0. 
10The RHS of the inequalities can be rewritten as
max
L supp(pm(σ))
max
x∈X(L)


∑
k∈L
pkm(σ)V
k(x) + v0
∑
k∈supp(pm(σ))L
pkm(σ)

 .
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Application to a mechanism design problem
In Section 3, we have established that, under various reasonable assump-
tions, Γ has a partitional equilibrium (σ, τ), in which both σ and τ are pure.
In this case, we can easily compute the highest ex ante expected utility that
player 2, interpreted here as the principal, can obtain at a partitional equi-
librium of Γ.11 As explained in Section 2, this application is inspired by a
particular case of Bester and Strausz (2001)’s model.
Let us show that there exists v0 ∈ R such that, for every z0 ≤ v0, the
highest ex ante expected utility player 2 can obtain at an arbitrary partitional
equilibrium of Γ(z0) (which can involve exit or not) is the same as in Γ. More
precisely, there exists v0 ∈ R such that, for every z0 ≤ v0, the best partitional
equilibrium for player 2 in Γ remains the best partitional equilibrium for
player 2 in Γ(z0).
Let v∗NE be the highest ex ante expected utility player 2 can obtain at a
partitional equilibrium of Γ. This number is well-defined if Γ has a partitional
equilibrium. Let (σ∗, τ ∗) achieve the expected utility v∗NE for player 2. Using
Proposition 4, there exists v0 sufficiently small such that for every z0 ≤ v0,
(σ∗, τ ∗) is an equilibrium without exit of Γ(z0) with the same expected utility
v∗NE for player 2. By Proposition 3, for every such z0, there does not exist
any equilibrium without exit giving a higher expected utility to player 2
(because such an equilibrium would still be an equilibrium of Γ, with the
same expected utilities).
Let us consider the partitional equilibria (σ, τ) of Γ(v0) in which exit
possibly occurs, i.e., in which the set
KE =
{
k ∈ K : Uk(τ ◦ σ(k)) < uk0
}
6= ∅,
i.e., pE =def
∑
k∈KE
pk > 0. The highest expected utility player 2 can achieve
at such an equilibrium is
pEv0 + (1− pE)v
where
v = max
k∈K
max
x∈X
V k(x).
If v0 is such that, for every pE that can arise given the prior p,
pEv0 + (1− pE)v ≤ v
∗
NE ,
11The number of pure equilibrium payoffs is finite, in the same way as the number of
partitions of K. Hence as soon as there is a pure equilibrium in Γ, there is an equilibrium
achieving the highest expected payoff for the receiver.
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namely, v0 ≤
1
pE
[v∗NE − (1− pE)v] (23)
then (σ∗, τ ∗) will guarantee the highest possible equilibrium utility to player
2, in every game Γ(z0) with z0 ≤ v0.
Let k be the type with the smallest prior probability, namely, such that
pk = min
{
p1, · · · , pK
}
. The inequality (23) will hold at every pE that can
arise given the prior p as soon as it holds at pE = p
k: we just have to require
v0 ≤
1
pk
[
v∗NE − (1− p
k)v
]
.
The previous result is quite intuitive: an upper bound on the receiver’s
expected utility at an equilibrium of Γ(v0) with exit is obtained when the
receiver’s proposal is rejected by only the least likely type, while the best
possible utility is achieved at all the other types. If v0 is sufficiently low, the
best equilibrium utility for the receiver in Γ(v0) will be not be achieved at
an equilibrium with exit, but rather at an equilibrium without exit, which is
in turn is necessarily an equilibrium of Γ.
6.2 Proof of Proposition 9
Proposition 9. Let us assume that K = {1, 2, 3}, T ∗ = {{1, 3}, {2, 3}}
the decision set X is compact and convex and the utility functions Uk and
V k, k ∈ K, are affine. Then Γ has a partially revealing equilibrium.
For simplicity we assume here that uk0 = 0 for each k. This is w.l.o.g.
since we can translate the payoffs of each type of the sender. We start with
preliminaries.
6.2.1 Mappings and multi-valued mappings
Define for each p in ∆(K):
f(p) = sup{
∑
k∈K p
kV k(x), x ∈ X(supp p)} ∈ IR ∪ {−∞},
Y (p) = Argmaxx∈X(supp p)
∑
k p
kV k(x) ⊂ X(supp p), and
Φ(p) = {(Uk(x))k∈K , x ∈ Y (p)} ⊂ IR
K .
The sets Y (p) and Φ(p) are convex compact subsets of IR and IRK , re-
spectively. If X(supp p) 6= ∅, then f(p) ∈ IR, Y (p) 6= ∅ and Φ(p) 6= ∅. For
each u ∈ Φ(p), we have uk ≥ 0 for each k ∈ supp p. At an equilibrium of Γ,
if the belief of the receiver (after having received the message of the sender)
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is p, then he has to propose a decision in Y (p), inducing a vector payoff in
Φ(p) for the different types of player 1.
We will use in the sequel the following three lemmas (Lemma 12 is a
simple mean-value theorem for correspondences).
Lemma 10. The mapping f is u.s.c. and convex.
If pn −−−→
n→∞
p ∈ ∆(K) with supp pn = supp p for each n, then f(pn) −−−→
n→∞
f(p).
Proof: Suppose pn −−−→
n→∞
p. Then for n large enough, supp pn ⊃ supp p so
X(supp pn) ⊂ X(supp p). It follows that lim supn f(pn) ≤ f(p). (whether
f(p) = −∞ or not)
If supp pn = supp p for each n, then |f(pn)− f(p)| ≤ supx∈X
∑
k∈K |p
k
n−
pk||V k(x)|, and f(pn) −−−→
n→∞
f(p).
If p = λp1 + (1 − λ)p2 with λ ∈ (0, 1), then supp p = supp p1 ∪ supp p2
and X(supp p) = X(supp p1)∩X(supp p2). If f(p) = −∞ then λf(p1)+(1−
λ)f(p2) ≥ f(p). Consider x in X(supp p), we have f(p1) ≥
∑
k∈K p
k
1V
k(x)
and f(p2) ≥
∑
k∈K p
k
2V
k(x), so λf(p1) + (1− λ)f(p2) ≥
∑
k∈K p
kV k(x), and
taking the supremum for x in X(supp p) we get λf(p1)+(1−λ)f(p2) ≥ f(p).
Hence f is convex. 
Lemma 11. Consider a converging sequence pn −−−→
n→∞
p ∈ ∆(K).
a) Assume lim supn f(pn) = f(p). Then if un −−−→
n→∞
u ∈ IRK, with un ∈
Φ(pn) for each n, we have u ∈ Φ(p),
b) Otherwise lim supn f(pn) < f(p). Then there exists n0 such that for
each u ∈ Φ(p) and n ≥ n0, one can find k ∈ supp pn\{supp p} such that
uk < 0.
Proof: a) Without loss of generality we assume that f(pn) −−−→
n→∞
f(p).
Write un = (U
k(xn))k∈K with xn in Y (pn) for each n. By taking a converg-
ing subsequence we can assume that xn converges to some x in X . Since
pn −−−→
n→∞
p, for n large enough supp pn ⊃ supp p so x ∈ X(supp p). And∑
k∈K p
k
nV
k(xn) = f(pn) −−−→
n→∞
f(p), so
∑
k∈K p
kV k(x) = f(p). Then x
belongs to Y (p), and u ∈ Φ(p).
b) Assume that lim supn f(pn) < f(p). We first claim that for n large
enough, Y (p) ∩ X(supp (pn)) = ∅. Otherwise, we can find x in Y (p) ∩
X(supp pn)) for infinitely many n’s, we have f(p) =
∑
k p
kV k(x) and f(pn) ≥
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∑
k p
k
nV
k(x) for infinitely many n’s, so lim supn f(pn) ≥ f(p) which is a
contradiction. We have shown that there exists n0 such that for n ≥ n0,
Y (p) ∩ X(supp (pn)) = ∅. If x ∈ Y (p) and n ≥ n0, then x /∈ X(supp pn).
So if u ∈ Φ(p) and n ≥ n0, there exists k ∈ supp pn\{supp p} such that
uk < 0.
Lemma 12. Let F : [0, 1]⇒ IR be a correspondence with non empty convex
values and compact graph. If F (0) ⊂ {x ∈ IR, x < 0} and F (1) ⊂ {x ∈
IR, x > 0}, there exists t in (0, 1) such that 0 ∈ F (t).
Proof: The sets C+ = {t ∈ [0, 1], F (t)∩IR+ 6= ∅} and C− = {t ∈ [0, 1], F (t)∩
IR− 6= ∅} are closed because F is u.s.c. Since F has non empty values, C+
and C− are non empty, and C+ ∪C− = [0, 1]. By connexity of [0, 1], one can
find t in both sets, that is such that F (t) intersects both IR+ and IR−. Since
F (t) is convex, it contains 0. 
6.2.2 Existence of an equilibrium
For k = 2, 3, define δk as the Dirac measure on the state k, and p−k as the
conditional probability on K knowing the state is not k:
δ2 = (0, 1, 0), δ3 = (0, 0, 1), p−2 = (
p1
p1 + p3
, 0,
p3
p1 + p3
) and p−3 = (
p1
p1 + p2
,
p2
p1 + p2
, 0).
Choose u2 in Φ(δ2), u3 in Φ(δ3), u1,2 in Φ(p−3) and u1,3 in Φ(p−2). These are
vectors in IR3, and to simply notations we write:
u2 =

 a+
−

 , u3 =

 b−
+

 , u1,2 =

 c ≥ 0+
−

 , u1,3 =

 d ≥ 0−
+

 .
with a = u12, b = u
1
3, c = u
1
1,2 and d = u
1
1,3. Here + means ≥ 0, and − means
< 0. We have u22 ≥ 0, u
3
3 ≥ 0, c ≥ 0, u
2
1,2 ≥ 0, d ≥ 0 and u
3
1,3 ≥ 0 since for
each p and u ∈ Φ(p), we have uk ≥ 0 for each k ∈ supp p. The subset {2, 3}
is not in T , this gives u32 < 0, u
2
3 < 0, u
3
1,2 < 0 and u
2
1,3 < 0.
Suppose a ≤ d. Then a simple equilibrium exists. Player 1 uses the par-
tition {{2}, {1, 3}} to communicate: he sends the message m = 2 if the state
is 2, and the message m = {1, 3} if the state is 1 or 3. Player 2 proposes
x2 in Y (δ2) such that u2 = (U
k(x2))k∈K after receiving m = 2, and proposes
x1,3 in Y (p−2) such that u1,3 = (U
k(x1,3))k∈K after receiving m = {1, 3}. By
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definition of Y (δ2) and Y (p−2), player 2 is in best reply. And no type of
player 1 has an incentive to deviate, so we have an equilibrium where player
1 plays pure. If we suppose b ≤ c, we have a similar equilibrium where player
1 uses the partition {{3}, {1, 2}}.
From now on, we assume that a > d ≥ 0 and b > c ≥ 0. Then a ≥ 0.
Consider any sequence (pn) converging to the Dirac measure on state 2 such
that supp pn = {1, 2} for each n. By Lemma 11 part b), we must have
lim supn f(pn) ≥ f(p), and since f is u.s.c., lim supn f(pn) = f(p). This be-
ing true for any such sequence, f(pn) −−−→
n→∞
f(p). That is, the restriction
of f to the set {p, supp p ⊂ {1, 2}} is continuous at δ2. And by Lemma
11 part a), the restriction of Φ to the segment [p−3, δ2] has a closed graph.
Similarly we have b ≥ 0, and we can prove that the restriction of f to the
set {p, supp p ⊂ {1, 3}} is continuous at δ3, and the restriction of Φ to the
segment [p−2, δ3] has a closed graph.
The initial probability p is on the segment [δ2, p−2], and also on the seg-
ment [δ3, p−3]. For t ∈ [0, 1], define qt = tδ2 + (1 − t)p−3 and q
′
t in [p−2, δ3]
such that p belongs to the segment [qt, q
′
t]. q
′
t is uniquely defined for each
t, q′0 = δ3 and q
′
1 = p−2. We are going to construct an equilibrium with
posteriors qt and q
′
t for some appropriate t. We need player 1 of type 1 to be
indifferent between splitting to qt and q
′
t.
δ2 δ3
δ1
p−3 p−2
qt
q′t
p
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Define the correspondence F : [0, 1]⇒ IR, with for each t in [0, 1]:
F (t) = {u1 − v1, u ∈ Φ(qt), v ∈ Φ(q
′
t)}.
F clearly has non empty convex compact values. We have seen that the
restrictions of Φ to the segments [p−3, δ2] and [p−2, δ3] have closed graphs,
moreover qt and q
′
t are continuous in t, hence F has a closed graph. F (0) =
{u1 − v1, u ∈ Φ(p−3), v ∈ Φ(δ3)}. If F (0) ∩ IR+ 6= ∅, there exists a pure
equilibrium where player 1 uses the partition {{3}, {1, 2}}, so we assume
that F (0) is a subset of {x ∈ IR, x < 0}. Similarly, we assume that F (1) =
{u1 − v1, u ∈ Φ(δ2), v ∈ Φ(p−2)} is a subset of {x ∈ IR, x > 0} (otherwise
there exists an equilibrium where player 1 uses the partition {{2}, {1, 3}}).
Then by Lemma 12 we can find t∗ in [0, 1] such that 0 ∈ F (t∗).
We can now conclude the proof. We can find x in Y (qt∗), y in Y (q
′
t∗),
u = (Uk(x))k ∈ Φ(qt∗) and u
′ = (Uk(y))k ∈ Φ(q
′
t∗) such that for some e ≥ 0:
u =

 e+
−

 , u′ =

 e−
+


We have an equilibrium as follows. Player 1 sends a message so as to induce
the posteriors qt∗ and q
′
t∗ (type 2 sends the message 2, type 3 sends the
message 3, and type 1 randomizes between the messages 2 and 3 so that the
posteriors are qt∗ after m = 2 and q
′
t∗ after m = 3). Player 2 then proposes
x at qt∗ , and y at q
′
t∗ . Player 2 is in best reply by construction. Type 1 of
player 1 is indifferent. If type 2 of player 1 deviates and sends q′t∗ , player 2
will propose y and type 2 will reject it, having the reserve payoff of 0, which
is not better than the payoff without deviating. Similarly, player 1 of type 3
has no profitable deviation, and we have an equilibrium. 
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